PI Brief Update

Jinking horses, Animals Act claims and dishonest exaggeration - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers

17/03/25. Hazel Boyd v Debbie Hughes [2025] EWHC 435 (KB)

Date of judgment:> 28 February 2025

Liability, quantum and fundamental dishonesty were in dispute in this claim for personal injury. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant as a rider and stable hand, and fell from a cantering horse sustaining a serious injury to her right arm. The Defendant was a racehorse breeder and trainer based in Tonyrefail in Wales with 35 horses. Unusually the claim was brought under section 2(2) of the Animals Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”) with no claim in negligence and so the issue was one of strict liability under the bespoke regime of the Act.

Facts

The accident happened whilst the Claimant was riding “Foxy” into a canter on the gallop. Approximately 150 yards into the exercise, the horse moved to his right with the nature, extent and causes of the movement hotly disputed. The movement caused the Claimant to fall off. She sustained a dislocation and articular fracture to her right elbow.

Liability

The judge held that Foxy was not restrained within the meaning of subsection 2(2)(a) of the 1971 Act. The judge also found that a sudden jink or shy whilst a horse was moving was not likely to unseat a rider, it was not a reasonable expectation that a rider would fall off and was relegated to a “mere possibility”.

He also held that if a person falls from a moving horse as a result of shying/jinking, it is likely that they would suffer injury. The judge then considered whether the damage or its severity was due to the characteristics of the animal under subsection 2(2)(b) although the Claimant was in difficulties given the judge found the movement of the horse relied on was not due to a “perceived threat”. The judge considered the characteristic was a general, normal characteristic of horses and so the claim failed on liability.

Fundamental Dishonesty

The case on fundamental dishonesty centred on what the Claimant had told medical experts, notably the Defendants’ experts, and also on sections of her witness statement. It was found that the Claimant had exaggerated her symptoms to two experts, failed to disclose her return to football and rugby in the same year as the accident and that she had been untruthful in saying she could not throw darts with her right hand.

Dishonesty was established, the real argument was about whether it was “fundamental” and the judge recited the well-known authorities on this aspect of the analysis at length. There were points either way. The judge held each counsel’s interpretation had been too extreme and that it was difficult to see how the dishonest exaggeration inflated the value of the claim other that in respect of a PSLA award and so the “core or heart of the claim” remained unaffected.

Quantum

PSLA was assessed at £40,000 and a further award of £2,750 was made for loss of congenial employment. I will not summarise other findings on Special Damages here.

Procedural issues

The judge was highly critical of the decision to issue the claim in the High Court and in London, and queried why a transfer had not been sought once proceedings were underway and its value became clearer. He was deeply unimpressed with the case management overall (and each party’s justification for the course taken) and considered that liability should have been determined as a preliminary issue. This course would have saved the significant expense of a quantum trial and the judge observed that split trials were common to many of the decisions on the 1971 Act cited during this trial. The judge gave guidance that “very careful consideration” should be given to CPR PD 7A para. 2 in respect of whether issuing a personal injury valued at less than £500,000 could be justified (nothing also that Cardiff District Registry was a preferable option were that the case).

Discussion

This case is another example of judicial criticism of the workability of the liability regime under the Animals Act 1971 and the usefulness of the decision as a precedent is limited to similar actions. The decision on fundamental dishonesty is of broader significance to personal injury practitioners. Boyd should be seen as a rather helpful guide for seriously injured Claimants responding to surveillance disclosure and also of possible arguments to deploy where there is debate about the scope of proven exaggeration and the reasons for it.

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2025/435?query=Hazel+Boyd+Debbie+Hughes

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