Mark Edwards & Ors v 2 Sisters Food Group Limited [2025] EWHC 1312 (KB) - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers
12/06/25. The case concerns an appeal by four former employees of 2 Sisters Food Group Ltd, who alleged that they contracted Covid-19 due to workplace safety failures in June 2020. The Respondent employer sought and obtained summary judgment in its favour, arguing the Claimants had no realistic prospects of success.
At the initial hearing, the County Court Judge (HHJ Owens) ruled that the Claimants would not be able to establish a causal link between any alleged breach and their illness, largely because Covid-19 was an ‘indivisible injury,’ and exposure could have occurred outside the workplace. The Judge also criticized the claimants for not producing expert evidence earlier and held that proceeding would not be proportionate.
Appeal
Permission to appeal was granted by Pepperall J, following a hearing on 19 December 2024. The following grounds were advanced by the Claimants, in summary: -
- The judge erred in failing to properly take into account the fact that the Respondent had not provided disclosure and that it was accordingly premature for the appellants to obtain expert evidence, which would be reliant on such documentation.
- The judge erred in failing to appreciate or have regard to the importance of such documentary, witness or expert evidence as to causation.
High Court Decision
Sir Peter Lane, sitting in the High Court, allowed the appeal. Summary judgment had been ordered prematurely, such that disputed factual issues had been resolved without trial, contrary to established principles: -
It is a trite but nonetheless important point that the summary judgment process is somewhat draconian in nature and should be reserved for those cases where it can readily be ascertained that the requirements of CPR 24.2 are met. Any application for summary judgment is bound to involve some degree of forensic analysis; but the courts have repeatedly warned against conducting what has come to be described as a “mini trial” of the case. [§28]
Lane J underlined that it cannot be a requirement that the existing evidence has itself to show an arguable case, since that would make it unnecessary to consider the impact of potential evidence. It was further noted that it would have been premature for the first-instance court to have formed a view on the ability of an as yet unknown expert to assist the court in resolving the causation issue, particularly when the nature of the evidence was not fully known.
Lane J did not endorse HHJ Owen’s criticism of the Claimant for not commissioning an expert report; in a claim where the costs of an expert were likely to be significant, when set against the likely monetary value of the claim, it was proportionate to proceed as the Claimants had.
Overall, Lane J found that the first-instance court had erred in concluding that the requirements of CPR 24.2(a)(i) were made out: “The Judge could not be satisfied that the appellants had no real prospect of succeeding on the claims. Like Pepperall J, I consider they face an uphill task. But that is not the test.” [§49]
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2025/1312
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