Rogers v. Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council - Proper Approach to the Assessment of Staged ATE Premiums
Personal injury
practitioners and particularly those who mainly or regularly represent
Claimants will welcome the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Rogers
v. Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council. The Court of Appeal in a judgment
delivered on 31 July 2006 gave arguably overdue guidance on the proper approach
to the assessment of staged after-the-event (‘ATE’) insurance premiums.
The substantive
claim was modest and straightforward. The infant Claimant suffered cuts from
shards of glass lying in a play area owned by the Defendant Local Authority.
The matter went to trial on the facts of the accident, the court found in the
Claimant’s favour and damages were agreed at £3,105 plus interest. At first
instance the DJ allowed a three-stage ATE premium of £5,103 (£4,860 plus insurance
premium tax) and upheld the 100% success fee. On appeal the premium was reduced
to £900 on the basis of information contained in Litigation Funding magazine
and because the DJ considered the premium ‘wholly excessive.’
Master Hurst heard
the evidence which was to form the foundation of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
In summary, he heard detailed evidence on the availability of ATE insurance,
the state of the market, the factors to be considered by a Claimant’s solicitor
in deciding whether a particular product was appropriate, and why the
information in Litigation Funding might not be considered complete. The
Claimant/Appellant’s evidence was heard ‘live’ and the Defendant/Respondent’s
evidence in witness statements, due to non-availability of the witnesses.
Submissions were made on behalf of interested parties the Law Society and
several insurance companies in addition to the parties to the appeal.
The issues for
decision were (i) the proper approach to proportionality in small personal
injury cases; (ii) the proper approach to evidence of reasonableness of the ATE
premium; and (iii) whether both staged and single-stage ATE premiums were
legitimate and recoverable. The issues were to be considered in the context of
CPR 44.4 – 44.5 and Section 11 of the Costs Practice Direction which sets out
the factors to be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs. This
makes it clear – as does common sense you might think - that the relationship
between the total costs and the value of the claim is not always a good test of
proportionality. Following the approach set out in Lownds v. Home Office (Practice Note) [2002] 1 WLR 2450, the Court of Appeal found that if it was
necessary to expend the full amount of the premium, then it should be
considered reasonable.
The court dealt
shortly with the question of whether a staged premium is legitimate by drawing
an analogy with two-stage success fees, which have been positively encouraged
by the courts. The level of risk to the ATE insurance provider rises the closer
a case gets to trial. As the trial approaches, the increasing costs should
encourage the Defendant to think seriously about the merits of its position and
its potential costs exposure, and the Court of Appeal felt this obligation was
consistent with the underlying philosophy of the CPR.
The Court of Appeal
found in this case it was impossible to say the premium was unreasonable given
the insurers’ estimated maximum loss figure of £6,500 (the loss would in fact
have been £6,875 so this was an astute estimate). Having assessed the risk at
almost 50/50 on the basis of previous experience of similar cases (slips and
trips), the insurer was entitled to charge a premium at the same sort of level
as the estimated maximum loss because otherwise it would be losing money. For
every case that is unsuccessful and the insurer must pay out, it must recover
the same amount in order to maintain the business.
This reasoning is
of course the same as that applied to risk assessment in CFA cases – if the
chances of success are only 50%, you must charge a 100% success fee because for
every case you win you will also lose one. (As pointed out by Lady Justice
Smith the evidence produced by DAS suggested that more like 70% of slipping and
tripping cases fail, a worrying statistic for some of us).
Further, comparison
with figures in Litigation Funding was not reliable as it was not legitimate to
compare the amount of a single premium model with the amount payable at the end
stage of a three-stage premium model. It was not comparing like with like. The
truth was in this case that the Defendant/Respondent was unable to identify a
cheaper product that met the client’s needs, and it was impossible to say that
the approach of the Claimant’s solicitor to making the decision was
unreasonable.
The Court of Appeal
did say however that in future where there is a policy with two or more stages,
the Defendant should be informed of this fact and should be told when the later
stage/s will be reached (the first obviously already having been incurred). If
this is done and the case fights, the Defendant’s liability to pay a higher
premium that would have been incurred if the case had been settled, or settled
earlier, should not be contentious in principle because the risks were made
known.
In relation to the
evidence required in consideration of the amount of the premium, it should
ordinarily suffice for the Claimant’s solicitor to write a brief note for the
purposes of assessment explaining how the particular policy was selected and
the basis on which the premium is rated, i.e. block rated or individually
rated. The implication here in my reading of this paragraph of the judgment
(117) is that challenges to the size of ATE premiums are to be discouraged,
although it seems that Lady Justice Smith had reservations about giving this
impression.
Based on my
experience the discouragement is understandable. Whilst Judges usually have a
great deal of experience in practice, whether at the Bar or as solicitors, to
call upon when assessing other costs and disbursements, many will have little
or no knowledge of the ATE insurance market or in some cases of how CFA cases
are run, and there is an obvious danger in the ‘broad brush’ approach. This
decision should give some comfort to Claimant’s solicitors as long as they are
able to give reasonable justification for the choice of a particular product.