JURY MANDATORY IN
PRINCESS DIANA INQUEST
(1) Jean Paul (2)
Gisele Paul (3) The Ritz Hotel Limited; and Mohammed Al Fayed v Deputy Coroner
of the Queen’s Household and Assistant Deputy Coroner of Surrey (Baroness
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss) [2007] EWHC 408 (Admin) 2 March 2007
Background
As assistant deputy coroner Lady Butler-Sloss is conducting
the inquests into the deaths of Diana Princess of Wales and Dodi Al Fayed. On 8th January 2007, at a pre-inquest hearing, she decided (among other things) that
she would conduct those inquests without a jury. All counsel had submitted that
s.8(3)(d) of the Coroners Act 1988 (which obliges a coroner to sit with a jury
where it appears that there is reason to suspect that “the death occurred in
circumstances the continuance or possible recurrence of which is prejudicial to
the health or safety of the public or any section of the public”) did not
apply. Submissions focussed on the coroner’s discretion to summon a jury under
s.8(4).
In the
High Court on an application for judicial review it was submitted that Lady
Butler-Sloss should have considered whether she was obliged to sit with a jury
under s.8(3)(d) and that, if she had done so, she would have concluded that she
was required to sit with a jury.
Decision
Smith
LJ, giving the judgment of the Court, was “uncertain of the reasons or
justification” for s.8(3)(d). The Court assumed that the threshold was set out
accurately by Sir David Cairns in R v HM Coroner at Hammersmith ex parte
Peach (No 1 and 2) [1980] 1 QB 211: “…the provision was intended to apply
only to circumstances the continuance or recurrence of which was preventable or
to some extent controllable…what is envisaged must…be something which might be
prevented or safeguarded by a public authority or some other person or body
whose activities can be said to affect a substantial section of the public”.
However the Court stated that it did “not understand the basis for the
statement that the activities must affect a ‘substantial section of the public’
as the section does not include that requirement.”
The
Court held that the threshold in s.8(3)(d) was met and quashed the decision of
Lady Butler-Sloss to hold the inquests without a jury. It considered that the
circumstances leading up to this collision were “very unusual” (there was
evidence that paparazzi on motorbikes had gone “crazy” and could have knocked
pedestrians over) and it was likely that there would be a recurrence of the
type of event in which the paparazzi on wheels pursued the Princess and Dodi Al
Fayed. The Court concluded, in effect, that we are all in danger of death by
paparazzi: it is not only members of the Royal Family and their friends (such
as Prince William’s girlfriend Kate Middleton) who are vulnerable to unwanted
attention, it is any celebrity; and it is not only those who are pursued who
are put at risk but also bystanders. The Court envisaged rules preventing
newspapers from using material obtained by the paparazzi in this way or making
the dangerous pursuit of people by the paparazzi an aggravated form of
dangerous driving or speeding.
Although
it was unnecessary to do so, the Court gave its view on the exercise by Lady
Butler-Sloss of her discretion under s.8(4). The Court stated that the policy
considerations behind ss.8(3)(a) and (b) (which make it mandatory to summon a
jury in cases where the death occurred in prison or while the deceased was in
police custody or resulted from an injury caused by a police officer in the
purported execution of his duty) were that, to foster public confidence in the
outcome of the inquest, a jury should be summoned in cases where the State, by
its agents, may have had some responsibility for the death. Mohammed Al Fayed
has indeed alleged that agents of the State were involved in the deaths of the
Princess and his son. If Lady Butler-Sloss decides that Mr Al Fayed’s
allegation must be inquired into, the possible role of State agents would be an
important consideration material to her discretionary decision whether to
summon a jury. The Court thought that that consideration might well be
determinative in favour of summoning a jury.
The
Court made other general comments about the way in which a coroner can and
should manage an inquest. For example:
· The logical
approach is for a coroner first to determine the scope of the inquest (which
Lady Butler-Sloss had not yet done) and only then to make a decision on the
relevance and applicability of ss.8(3) and (4).
· The coroner’s
power in s.14 to transfer jurisdiction to another coroner if “expedient” to do
so gives a coroner a very wide power to make the most appropriate practical
arrangements for the management of the inquest (insofar as that can be achieved
by decisions about which coroner has jurisdiction). The Court stated that it
was quite proper for Lady Butler-Sloss to have taken into account the need for
a suitably equipped Court such as the Royal Courts of Justice. The solution
proposed by the Court was that in order to have the inquest held there she
could invite the coroner for Westminster (in whose district the Royal Courts
lie) to accept jurisdiction over both inquests under s.14; he could then
appoint her as an assistant deputy coroner for his district.
Lady
Butler-Sloss has since been appointed as the second deputy coroner for Inner
West London and the inquests have been transferred to that jurisdiction. This
and other details relating to the inquests are to be found on the inquests’
website, http://www.butler-sloss-inquests.gov.uk/
Commentary
The
Court’s comments on the interpretation of s.8(4) betray its (unsurprising) view
that the public interest in this case requires a jury. The Court’s reliance on
the mandatory provisions of s.8(3)(d) ensured that there was no room for
argument (as there would still have been if Lady Butler-Sloss had been asked to
re-exercise her discretion under s.8(4)). The application of s.8(3)(d) to this
case is imaginative. It would be unsurprising if advocates who presented
similarly creative applications of the provision to coroners up and down the
country were given shorter shrift.
AMY
STREET, Barrister
3
Serjeants’ Inn
London
EC4Y 1BQ
