Glaister & Anor, R (on the application of) v Assistant Coroner for North Wales [2025] EWHC 1018 (Admin) - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers

20/05/25. In Glaister, the Court had sent out a draft judgment in a judicial review case relating to a coroner’s decision. Specifically, this was circulated in the form of a ‘confidential embargoed draft judgment’ (CEDJ). However, it became clear that journalists had knowledge of the decision and also a copy of the draft judgment itself. The Court enquired as to how this came about, and found that this was due to the actions of someone in the marketing department of one of the solicitors firms involved, namely Ms Pearson of Fieldfishers.
The were two tasks before the court: i) to determine what exactly had gone wrong; and ii) to determine whether a contempt of court had been committed, and if so whether to proceed against the individual(s) concerned.
Fordham J made the following findings of facts, which were held to constitute breaches:
- Firstly, Ms Pearson sent two external emails to journalists, which implied the outcome;
- Secondly, Ms Pearson sent the CEDJ externally to four journalists;
- Thirdly, Ms Pearson sent quotations and content to journalists; and
- Fourthly, Ms Pearson organised marketing steps for the firm, including filming an analysis video interview and writing a case study.
Fordham J emphasised that the court embargo is fundamentally different from a journalism embargo:
- The CEDJ is a Court document. The Court is the custodian. The Court has imposed strict conditions. Those strict conditions appear on the document itself. They are “formal”. Their consequences are “legal”. There is nothing “informal” about any of this. Nobody who receives the CEDJ is being allowed to decide they are a custodian of news; or that they can identify “trusted” recipients; that all that matters is that the draft judgment or its substance should not be “made public”; that this can be achieved because it can “agree” a position with other recipients; or that damage to a relationship or reputation is an adequate protection or consequence.
Nevertheless, Fordham J held that the breaches of the embargo did not constitute a contempt of court, because there was no deliberate intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice. It was highlighted that Ms Pearson was not legally qualified and, once the breaches were identified, fully co-operated in rectifying the situation. On this basis, Fordham J determined not to proceed to issuing a summons, nor to refer the matter to the Attorney General.
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/admin/2025/1018?query=glaister
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