News Category 3
Developing the Law Bit by Bit: High Court Rules on Disclosure Following Bitcoin Theft - Georgina Pressdee, Temple Garden Chambers
17/06/26. On 5 June 2026, Judge Guy Vassall-Adams KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, handed down his judgment in Wilden v Persons Unknown [2026] EWHC 1355 (KB). The issue for determination was whether the Claimant’s two applications – for a freezing injunction against the First Defendant (a person unknown) and an order for disclosure against the Second Defendant (Huobi Global SA) – should continue to trial.
Background
The Claimant had been fraudulently induced by the First Defendant to transfer to him over €2.5 million worth of Bitcoin. Forensic tracing had determined that the assets had ultimately been transferred to infrastructure associated with the Second Defendant’s currency exchange (HTX). As a centralised cryptocurrency exchange, HTX would be expected to operate under Know-Your-Customer and Anti-Money-Laundering procedures, enabling it to identify the account holder. However, HTX was on a warning list for operating without proper authorisation and was the subject of legal proceedings brought by the FCA. When the Claimant contacted HTX asking it to identify the relevant accounts, HTX was uncooperative and did not provide any meaningful assistance, even after the Claimant obtained an urgent interim order for disclosure.
Ruling
Judge Vassall-Adams KC determined that it was appropriate to grant both orders. In respect of the order for disclosure, this was made pursuant to the Court’s jurisdiction under Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274, which empowers the Court to make an order requiring a third party to provide information about a Claimant’s property or other assets. It arises where there is strong evidence that the Claimant’s property has been misappropriated and may intrude into what would otherwise be confidential customer information (Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274 at [44]). Five criteria must be satisfied (Bankers Trust at [13]-[19]):
- There must be good grounds for concluding that the money/assets belonged to the Claimant.
- There must be a real prospect that the information sought will lead to location or preservation of those assets.
- So far as possible, the order must be directed at uncovering particular assets and not wider than necessary.
- The interests of the Claimant must be balanced against possible detriment to respondent in complying, including the infringement of privacy/confidentiality.
- The applicant must provide undertakings to pay the expenses of respondent in complying and compensate the respondent in damages.
Judge Vassall-Adams KC considered that the first four criteria were easily satisfied. When it came to criterion five, the learned Judge commented that –
“The Claimant has given appropriate undertakings to Huobi, although his ability to meet the financial undertakings is limited.There is authority that a freezing injunction should not be refused solely on the basis that a Claimant’s lack of means makes an undertaking of limited value, where the other criteria are satisfied: Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings [1980] 1 WLR 1252 (CA). Given that the Claimant’s lack of means is because this fraud deprived him of his life savings, it is plainly appropriate to accept his financial undertakings even if they are of limited value.”.
Comment
Where an applicant is of limited means, it would appear that the requirement to provide an undertaking can easily become redundant. In this instance the learned Judge relied on the cause of action against the First Defendant being the reason for the Claimant’s limited financial means. When phrased in this way, the Judgment could have wider implications. In the context of personal injury, it could be argued that the cause of action has deprived the Claimant of the ability to offer a meaningful undertaking where the Claimant is no longer able to work or has had to pay for injury-related costs such as treatment, prosthetics or home adaptations.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/ShutterWorx
Nothing in the notes: PI claim succeeds despite gap in records - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers
12/06/26. Michael Brooks Reid discusses the decision of Mr Justice Mansfield in AXA Insurance PLC v Maher [2026] EWHC 1365 (KB), a case which demonstrates that an absence of contemporaneous records need not always be fatal to a PI claim.
Facts
The claimant was injured in an RTA on 11 July 2018. It was accepted that he sustained a soft tissue injury to his left hand and lower arm. It was not accepted however that he suffered - as claimed – a 5-year acceleration of a degenerative condition in his neck and shoulder.
It was agreed that the claimant suffered from neck and shoulder pain around December 2018; 5 months after the accident. The claimant claimed to have suffered neck and shoulder pain immediately following the accident, but none of the contemporaneous records – A&E notes, GP records, a claim notification form, an incident report, a police witness statement, and the report by a treating orthopaedic surgeon – made any mention of neck or shoulder pain.
The defendant relied on the silent records to assert that the claimant did not in fact experience any neck and shoulder pain before December 2018, and that the December 2018 onset was entirely independent of the accident. The claimant’s claim to the contrary – including the account he gave to his medico-legal expert – was said to be (fundamentally) dishonest.
First instance decision
The trial judge, HHJ Pema, found that the claimant had experienced minor soft tissue symptoms in his left neck and shoulder following the accident, notwithstanding their absence from the contemporaneous records. However, he found that those symptoms would have resolved within three months, so that the more significant neck and shoulder problems from December 2018 were not caused or accelerated by the accident.
Damages were assessed in respect of the other injuries with a modest uplift for the minor neck and shoulder injury, resulting in an award of £3,609.83, a far cry from the pleaded claim of £50,000 to £70,000.
High Court decision
AXA appealed on two grounds: first, that the judge was wrong to find that the claimant had experienced neck or shoulder symptoms in the period between the accident and December 2018; and secondly (contingent on succeeding on the first ground) that the judge should have therefore found the claimant to be fundamentally dishonest within the meaning of section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, resulting in the dismissal of his claim.
Mansfield J began by setting out the well-established principles governing appeals on questions of fact. He cited the summary of Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, which identifies – in quite fun language - reasons why appellate courts should be slow to interfere with trial judges’ findings of fact – this included that the trial is “the first and last night of the show” and that the appellate court is “island hopping” whereas the trial court is surveying the whole sea of evidence.
AXA’s primary submission was that as the contemporaneous documents were uniformly silent as to neck and shoulder pain, the claimant could not prove those injuries.
The judge rejected that submission. The Court should not fall into the trap of “slavish adherence” to the documentary record, and the absence of a reference to a particular fact contemporaneously does not of itself establish that the fact did not exist. Where there is a significant absence in the records, a range of questions must be asked: was the matter not mentioned, or mentioned but not recorded; and if not recorded, was that due to error, or to the maker’s view of relevance? The trial judge had the advantage of seeing the claimant cross-examined on the documentary record and was entitled to accept that neck and shoulder symptoms may have been overlooked in the initial months as the less significant complaint, with the hand and arm injuries dominating.
Comment
It is not uncommon to find cases where there are glaring silences in the contemporaneous records in relation to claimed injuries. There is plentiful case law which assists defendants in such circumstances; the judgment of Martin Spencer J in Molodi v Cambridge Vibration Maintenance Service [2018] EWHC 1288 (QB) comes to mind. The judgment in this case may provide some helpful ammunition for claimants in response, seeking to persuade the court that the absence of contemporaneous records need not be fatal to their claim.
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Causation, credibility and fundamental dishonesty: Lessons from a contested Fast-Track personal injury trial - Calum Pakey, Solicitor, RTA, Express Solicitors
25/05/26. Personal injury claims, in which primary liability is no longer disputed, frequently turn on more nuanced issues of causation and credibility.
A case I worked on illustrates how allegations of fundamental dishonesty can arise from relatively common evidential inconsistencies and the potentially serious consequences had such allegations been established at trial.
The claim arose from a road traffic accident in January 2022, when the defendant moved off from a parked position and collided with the claimant’s vehicle. Although breach of duty was admitted, the defendant denied the accident caused the alleged injuries. The defendants further alleged that the claimant brought a claim which was fundamentally dishonest.
The claimant suffered a range of injuries, including neck and shoulder pain, a wrist injury, rib and abdominal pain, and psychological symptoms. However, the claimant’s evidence was not perfect. The defence relied on inconsistencies between claim notification forms, variations in the reporting of time off work, the later introduction of certain symptoms and limited medical attendance following the accident. There was also evidence of pre-existing issues affecting similar areas of the body.
On that basis, the defendant invited the court not only to reject the claim on causation grounds but to go further and make a finding of fundamental dishonesty. The distinction was critical. A failure to prove causation would limit or defeat the claim; a finding of fundamental dishonesty would engage section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, exposing the claimant to dismissal of the entire claim. The claimant would also be exposed to adverse costs consequences and the loss of qualified one-way costs shifting protection.
The court therefore undertook a careful, injury-by-injury analysis of causation. The claimant succeeded in establishing that the accident caused her wrist, neck, shoulder and psychological injuries, but failed to prove that her rib and abdominal symptoms were attributable to the collision. That finding was based on the limited medical evidence, inconsistencies in the records and the presence of pre-existing issues. The court was clear that the failure to establish those injuries was not a product of dishonesty, but of insufficient evidence.
During cross-examination at trial, the claimant’s intention was to be helpful to the court in answering the opposing barrister’s questions and explaining the inconsistencies in her case. In evidence, she provided explanations for the discrepancies, including the passage of time, the informal management of symptoms and confusion as to how certain injuries had been described. It was submitted by the claimant’s barrister that such inconsistencies were neither unusual nor indicative of dishonesty, but rather reflective of the realities of recalling events some years later.
The court accepted this submission in part. The claimant was found to be an honest and credible witness who had done her best to assist the court. The allegation of fundamental dishonesty was rejected. In doing so, the court recognised the important distinction between a witness whose evidence is imperfect and one who is deliberately untruthful.
The overall outcome was favourable to the claimant, who recovered damages exceeding their £6,000 Part 36 offer, thereby securing the usual uplifts and costs consequences.
This case highlights the defendants’ willingness to make allegations of fundamental dishonesty where inconsistencies arise. While such arguments will not succeed without clear evidence of deliberate untruthfulness, they significantly raise the stakes of litigation. Had the defendant succeeded, the claimant would have faced the loss of her entire award and potentially an adverse costs order.
This case also demonstrates that it is important to address inconsistencies proactively. They often form the foundation for allegations of fundamental dishonesty and, if left unexplained, can pose serious risks for claimants. However, where inconsistencies are confronted directly and explained in a clear and credible manner, they need not be detrimental to the claim. This case serves as a reminder that the line between an unsuccessful claim and a fundamentally dishonest one is not always sharply defined, but the consequences of crossing it can be severe.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/KonovalikovAndrey
Misfeasance in public office: PI claim against four police institutions reinstated - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers
20/05/26. Michael Brooks Reid discusses the recent Court of Appeal decision in Van Buuren v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Constabularyand Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 391, in which the Master of the Rolls gave a striking judgment reinstating a litigant in person’s claims for misfeasance in public office arising out of an allegedly falsified police investigation into a road traffic accident.
Facts
In August 2013, the claimant fell from, or was knocked off his bicycle near Cambridge. He lost consciousness for over thirty minutes and was seriously injured. He had no recollection of the accident.
Some minutes after the accident, two officers (Officers A and B), attended the scene. A collision report produced on behalf of the Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire Constabularies concluded that the claimant had fallen from his bicycle by slipping on gravel and that there had been no witnesses to the accident. The report included an unsigned statement by a “Mr D”, said to have been driving immediately behind the claimant. Mr D’s statement appeared to be in Officer A’s handwriting.
The claimant made a formal complaint under the Police Reform Act 2002, asserting that the Cambridgeshire Constabulary had failed to properly investigate the accident. That complaint was rejected and an appeal to the (now) Independent Office for Police Conduct (“IOPC”) was dismissed.
The following year, the claimant tracked down “Mrs C”, who told him: (i) that she had witnessed the accident; (ii) that a car had clipped his bicycle causing him to fall; (iii) that she had relayed this account to the officers at the scene; and (iv) that she was never contacted for a witness statement.
The claimant sued the three Chief Constables as well as the IOPC under the tort of misfeasance in public office, alleging that Constable A deliberately falsified the investigation to conceal the collision. He sought summary judgment against all defendants and a strike out of the Constabularies’ defence.
The Law
The tort of misfeasance in public office requires a claimant to establish that the defendant: (i) acted in the exercise of a public power or duty; (ii) acted with malice; and (iii) caused damage to the claimant. Malice may be “targeted” (an intention to harm the particular claimant) or “untargeted” (knowledge that the defendant has no power to act as it does and that they are likely to cause harm to a class of persons to which the claimant belongs): Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of The Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1.
High Court decision
Sweeting J struck out most of the claimant’s claims. He permitted the claim against the Cambridgeshire Constabulary (D1) to proceed limited to the allegation that Constable A had deliberately falsified the investigation. He refused the claimant’s applications for summary judgment and strike out of the Constabularies’ defence and ordered the claimant to pay the costs of D2, D3 and D4.
The claimant appealed and D1 cross-appealed.
Court of Appeal
Before a highly experienced bench of the Court of Appeal (Vos MR, Asplin and Elisabeth Laing LJJ), the claimant appeared in person, the three Chief Constables (D1-D3) were represented by leading Counsel, and the IOPC (D4) was represented by Counsel. Following some probing questioning by the MR, Counsel for D1-D3 sought an adjournment to take instructions. Perhaps sensing the direction of the judicial winds, he returned to inform the Court that D1 was withdrawing its cross-appeal and would consent to reinstating all claims against D1-D3 and reversing the costs order. Counsel for D4 made the same concession.
The Court was therefore only required to determine the claimant’s appeal against the refusal of summary judgment and strike out of the defendants’ Defence. The Court dismissed both appeals, finding that it was impossible to say that the defendants had no real prospect of success.
The Court’s discontent with the defendants’ conduct is plain in the MR’s judgment. However, he acknowledged a number of live issues, none of which could be resolved summarily. These were:
- Whether limitation is to be extended under s.33 of the Limitation Act 1980, the claim having been brought out of time;
- whether the failure to seek witness evidence and the reliance on Mr D’s unsigned and potentially self-serving account reflected an improper motive; and
- causation of the claimant’s psychiatric injury.
The Court found force in the claimant’s submissions that fair trial was no longer possible and that the defendants have had 13 years to put forward a substantive defence but had failed to do so. Nonetheless, the MR concluded that a fair trial remained possible and ordered that the matter be listed for trial in the High Court this year. Public confidence in the police and in the complaints process required that cases of this kind be neither ignored nor “swept under the carpet.”
Comment
Whilst somewhat out of the ordinary for a PI brief update, this is an interesting judgment. Firstly, it is a tribute to our legal system that the Court of Appeal has given proper and careful consideration to the merits of a claim brought by a litigant in person, alleging serious misconduct against respected (and funded) institutions. Secondly, PI claims brought under the tort misfeasance in public office are relatively rare, and it is not hard to see why – the test, particularly the mental element, is a stringent one. However, proper disclosure will now take place, and the case has been earmarked by the country’s most senior civil judge. The defendants will now have to treat the claimant’s allegations seriously. If the case does not now quietly settle, it will be one to watch.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/onfilm
A Dishonest Mistake: Conscious Exaggeration and Fundamental Dishonesty in Uchechukwu Atuanya v Ministry of Defence - Georgina Pressdee, Temple Garden Chambers
28/04/26. On 30 March 2026, Rory Dunlop KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, handed down his judgment in Uchechukwu Atuanya v Ministry of Defence [2026] EWHC 758 (KB). The sole issue for determination was whether the Claimant had been fundamentally dishonesty (FD) within the meaning of CPR r44.16(1).
Background
The Claim was for damages for a non-freezing cold injury (NFCI) and associated psychiatric issues sustained while serving in the Army. The Claimant had been medically discharged in 2013 after 14 years of service. The neurological experts agreed that the Claimant had a mild NFCI but that it would have had a negligible impact. However, there was also evidence that the Claimant suffered from a psychiatric illness.
Permission was sought to amend the Defence to include an allegation of FD following the disclosure of covert surveillance evidence. The footage showed that the Claimant had attended his medical appointments heavily clad and limping with an unusual gait but that these features were not present on another day in similar conditions. In their subsequent (second) joint report, the neurological experts expressed concern about malingering. A notice of discontinuance was served but the trail was maintained in order to determine FD. The Defence experts attended and were cross-examined by the Claimant, who appeared in person.
Ruling: The Claimant was Fundamentally Dishonest
It was posited by one expert that some patients exaggerate to convince – they are so eager to convey their suffering that they say thing they know are not true. The Judge considered this dishonest for two reasons: (1) the ordinary person would consider telling untruths dishonest, especially in a claim for money; (2) including such individuals within QOCS would flout its purpose – to encourage honesty.
The Judge went on to consider that the Claimant was an unreliable witness but this did not necessarily make him dishonest. Nevertheless, the Claimant had exaggerated his symptoms and, whilst those exaggerations were not calculated, some of them were conscious. The Claimant had exaggerated to convince; that was dishonest.
The Claimant had not been dishonest in describing his psychological difficulties. There was overwhelming evidence of a genuine mental illness, including longstanding reporting and several years of anti-depressants. This could be reconciled with the surveillance evidence. However, the Claimant did consciously exaggerate his need for warm clothing both by deliberately overstating that need and attending his medical examinations heavily clad. That was revealed by the surveillance evidence which showed him wearing a t-shirt in similar conditions. His particular sensitivity to cold was fundamental to his claim, which included £150,000 for disadvantage on the open labour market due to his inability to work in a cold environment. The Claimant was held to be fundamentally dishonest on that basis. It was therefore unnecessary to reach a decision on other allegations of FD.
Comment
This decision is a reminder that dishonesty is an objective standard. It is also a warning to Claimants that conscious exaggeration can result in a finding of FD, even if it is not calculated. Whether a Claimant has consciously or unconsciously exaggerated may be a difficult to decipher, but the cost consequences of that finding are likely to be significant.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/ilbusca
More Articles...
- Smile, you’re on camera! Surveillance footage and the perils of defendants sitting on their hands for too long - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers
- On the Right Track: High Court Rules on Pre-issue Settlements and CPR r46.13(3) - Georgina Pressdee, Temple Garden Chambers
- Supreme Court revives 'lost years' claims by young child claimants: CCC v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] UKSC 5 - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers
- A Conflict of Schedules: Court of Appeal Rules on Failure to File a Costs Schedule - Georgina Pressdee, Temple Garden Chambers
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