News Category 2
R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey and Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank QPSC and Another [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers
10/06/25. Date of judgment: 6 June 2025
The Divisional Court’s judgment in these joined contempt cases following a Hamid hearing heard on 23 May 2025 has received wide-spread attention in both the legal press and national media. I want to highlight the unequivocal guidance that the Divisional Court has given as to the use of artificial intelligence by legal professionals and the salutary reminder of the regulatory responsibilities surrounding the use of emerging technologies.
Facts
In brief summary, the court considered two cases in the context of regulating its own procedure and the duties lawyers owe to the court. Without going into the particular facts of the conduct in each case, in outline there was actual or suspected use by both a barrister and solicitor of generative artificial intelligence tools to produce legal documents including skeleton arguments and witness statements. Those documents were placed before the High Court. In each case, lawyers had relied on numerous authorities which upon investigation by the court were found not to exist. The cases were fictions although the principles enunciated were in some cases legally correct. In its judgment the Divisional Court explored in considerable detail, with privilege having been waived in material respects, the concerns the use of this technology gave rise to touching upon conduct, competence and supervision.
Decision
The court acknowledged that artificial intelligence is a powerful tool likely to have an important role on litigation in the future but one that carried considerable risk. That is particularly so because in the interests of the administration of justice, the court expects to rely on the integrity of those who appear before it without question and that submissions made to it can be supported. The court also reminded practitioners that the duty rests on individual lawyers where artificial intelligence is used to conduct research or where reliance is placed on the work of others who have done so. The court continued:
“practical and effective measures must now be taken by those within the legal profession … Those measures must ensure that every individual currently providing legal services within this jurisdiction (whenever and wherever they were qualified to do so) understands and complies with their professional and ethical obligations and their duties to the court if using artificial intelligence.”
The court referred to the plethora of published professional guidance drawing attention to the limitations and risks of using artificial intelligence for legal research; alongside the relevant rules within the Bar Standards Board Handbook (for barristers) and the Code of Conduct (for solicitors) which are engaged by the use of such technologies. The court also surveyed the range of powers available to the court to ensure those who appear before it comply with their professional duties ranging from referring matters to the police for criminal investigation where false material is deliberately placed before the court to contempt of court proceedings (at issue in these cases), regulatory referrals (which the court also made), the sanctions of strike out or wasted costs within particular proceedings, or powerful public admonishments in public judgments.
In concluding, the court also emphasised that it considered the existing guidance on the use of artificial intelligence available was insufficient to address its potential misuse; a clear signal that the Divisional Court was not persuaded these were isolated cases of poor conduct. The court stated that “more needs to be done” to ensure existing guidance was followed and lawyers complied with their ethical duties. The Bar Council and the Law Society have been invited to consider what further steps are to be taken.
Discussion
The message from the court could not have been clearer: lawyers have professional duties to understand the limitations of artificial intelligence and to verify the accuracy of any documentation produced reliant on new technologies.
Image ©iStockphoto.com/sompong_tom
Glaister & Anor, R (on the application of) v Assistant Coroner for North Wales [2025] EWHC 1018 (Admin) - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers
20/05/25. In Glaister, the Court had sent out a draft judgment in a judicial review case relating to a coroner’s decision. Specifically, this was circulated in the form of a ‘confidential embargoed draft judgment’ (CEDJ). However, it became clear that journalists had knowledge of the decision and also a copy of the draft judgment itself. The Court enquired as to how this came about, and found that this was due to the actions of someone in the marketing department of one of the solicitors firms involved, namely Ms Pearson of Fieldfishers.
The were two tasks before the court: i) to determine what exactly had gone wrong; and ii) to determine whether a contempt of court had been committed, and if so whether to proceed against the individual(s) concerned.
Fordham J made the following findings of facts, which were held to constitute breaches:
- Firstly, Ms Pearson sent two external emails to journalists, which implied the outcome;
- Secondly, Ms Pearson sent the CEDJ externally to four journalists;
- Thirdly, Ms Pearson sent quotations and content to journalists; and
- Fourthly, Ms Pearson organised marketing steps for the firm, including filming an analysis video interview and writing a case study.
Fordham J emphasised that the court embargo is fundamentally different from a journalism embargo:
- The CEDJ is a Court document. The Court is the custodian. The Court has imposed strict conditions. Those strict conditions appear on the document itself. They are “formal”. Their consequences are “legal”. There is nothing “informal” about any of this. Nobody who receives the CEDJ is being allowed to decide they are a custodian of news; or that they can identify “trusted” recipients; that all that matters is that the draft judgment or its substance should not be “made public”; that this can be achieved because it can “agree” a position with other recipients; or that damage to a relationship or reputation is an adequate protection or consequence.
Nevertheless, Fordham J held that the breaches of the embargo did not constitute a contempt of court, because there was no deliberate intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice. It was highlighted that Ms Pearson was not legally qualified and, once the breaches were identified, fully co-operated in rectifying the situation. On this basis, Fordham J determined not to proceed to issuing a summons, nor to refer the matter to the Attorney General.
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/admin/2025/1018?query=glaister
Image ©iStockphoto.com/prizela_ning
Claimant fruit picker’s employer found negligent but not the third party driver who drove into collision with him - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers
16/05/25. Radoslav Pashamov v (1) Leon Taylor and (2) Edward Vinson Limited [2025] EWHC 1035 (KB)
Date of judgment: 30 April 2025
Simon Tinkler sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge recently handed down judgment on liability in a claim for personal injury brought against a third party driver and the Claimant’s employer. Both the accident circumstances and the treatment of primary liability and contributory negligence were relatively novel.
The facts
The Claimant, Mr Pashamov, was employed by EV Limited, the Second Defendant. He worked on a farm growing fruit. At the end of his shift, he was returned by a bus provided by the company to a caravan site where he was living.
On 23 June 2020 after first picking up Mr Pashamov, the bus made a second stop at the side of a rural main road to collect other employees. He got off the bus and proceeded to cross the road to let those employees know the bus had arrived. When he was halfway across the road, a car driven by Mr Leon Taylor, the First Defendant, collided with him and he was thrown into the air. Mr Pashamov was in hospital for a month and had not worked since the accident.
Each party’s case
The Claimant’s case against the First Defendant was that his...
Image ©iStockphoto.com/Hirurg
Nigel Mather & Ors v Lakbir Basran & Ors [2025] EWHC 438 (Ch) HHJ - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers
17/04/25. In Mather v Basran, the High Court addressed several issues surrounding an adjournment request made by the Defendant, Mr Rattan, on medical grounds during a trial involving allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation.
The trial commenced on February 10, 2025, and Mr. Rattan, who was appearing as a litigant in person, reported suffering from Bell's Palsy, a condition that caused facial weakness.
On the second day of the trial, Mr. Rattan arrived at court but later indicated he was unwell, prompting a brief adjournment to allow for his medical condition to be assessed. Despite his initial claims of illness, Mr. Rattan managed to participate in the trial proceedings without any significant difficulty, leading the judge to question the legitimacy of his adjournment request. The trial judge, His Honour Judge Hodge KC, acknowledged Mr. Rattan's medical condition but also emphasised the importance of ensuring that both parties could participate equally in the proceedings.
Mr. Rattan submitted a medical certificate stating he was not fit to attend court for the next two weeks, but the judge noted that it did not address his ability to participate remotely via live video link. The judge pointed out that, given the current technological capabilities, it was increasingly feasible for parties to attend court remotely, even with medical conditions. This was particularly relevant as Mr. Rattan was not providing live witness evidence and would simply be making submissions.
The judge expressed concerns about Mr. Rattan's previous history in the case, including his lack of timely applications for relief from sanctions regarding his witness statement. This history raised doubts about the sincerity of his request for an adjournment. The judge noted that Mr. Rattan had been aware of the trial date for over 11 months and questioned why he had not sought medical treatment or raised concerns about his health sooner.
Ultimately, the judge denied Mr. Rattan's request for an adjournment, concluding that his participation in the trial had not been materially impaired by his medical condition. The court proceeded with the trial as planned, allowing for Mr. Rattan to participate remotely if necessary. The judge’s decision was influenced by the understanding that an adjournment could disrupt the proceedings and the court's resources, emphasising the need for expedience and fairness to all parties involved.
Nigel Mather & Ors v Lakbir Basran & Ors [2025] EWHC 438 (Ch) HHJ
Image ©iStockphoto.com/DNY59
Multi Track allocation remains decisive to the disapplication of the Fixed Costs rules - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers
15/04/25. Laura Attersley v UK Insurance Limited [2025] EWHC 884 (KB)
Date of judgment: 11 April 2025
This claim arose from unremarkable circumstances: a claim for personal injury consisting of what at first appeared to whiplash injuries arising from a road traffic accident on 9 March 2018. The issue which the High Court grappled with, on appeal from the County Court at Southend, was whether the Claimant who had accepted a valid Part 36 offer was entitled only to fixed costs or costs on the standard basis up to the point of expiry of the relevant Part 36 offer?
Facts and procedural background
The claim had started under the RTA Protocol with a CNF giving a value up to £10,000 but exited as liability was (initially) disputed. On 4 March 2021 the Claimant then issued claiming up to £150,000 in damages and enclosed three medical reports. The Defendant made a Part 36 offer of £45,000 pre-allocation. Liability was later admitted. After allocation to the Multi Track the following year, the Claimant accepted the Part 36 offer (out of time).
A case management conference was held on 5 January 2022 to determine allocation and the Claimant was given permission to rely on medical experts in six disciplines. It was agreed that Multi Track allocation was appropriate.
On 18 May 2022 the Defendant applied to amend its Defence to allege fundamental dishonesty and a hearing was listed for 1 August 2022. Before that hearing, the Claimant accepted the Part 36 offer and a dispute as to the costs regime arose with the Circuit Judge limited the Claimant to Fixed Costs.
Issue
The Claimant’s case, relying on rule 45.29B of the “old” Part 45 of the CPR, was that she was entitled to her reasonable costs on the standard basis up to the expiry of the relevant offer. In contrast the Defendant contended, relying on rule 36.20, that in these circumstances the Claimant was only entitled to her fixed costs. The real issue was whether Quader v Esure [2017] 1 WLR 1924 had already decided the point and the effect of rule 45.29B.
Plainly at the time of acceptable, this was a case unquestionably allocated to the Multi Track but when the...
Image ©iStockphoto.com/Photofex-AT
More Articles...
- Morris v Williams [2025] EWHC 218 (KB) - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers
- Jinking horses, Animals Act claims and dishonest exaggeration - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers
- Omanovic v Shamaazi Ltd & Ismael Abdela Mohammed [2025] EWHC 110 (KB) - Andrew Ratomski, Temple Garden Chambers
- Smith -v- AXA Insurance UK PlC & Spectra Drive Limited (24th December 2024) - Philip Matthews, Temple Garden Chambers
![Appeal judge rules that credit hire company has no costs liability following a finding of fundamental dishonesty in personal injury case: RSA v. Fastrack Solutions Limited [2023] 4 WLUK 92 - David Bowden, Erimus Chambers](/content/images/resized/images/stories/carkeys_72_72.jpg)
