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What compelling reason? Second limb of the summary judgment test CPR r. 24.3(b) - Michael Brooks Reid, Temple Garden Chambers

17/02/26. Michael Brooks Reid discusses an appeal decision in an interesting employer’s liability meets clinical negligence case of Michelle Prudence v Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 96 (KB).

Facts

The two claimants were midwives at the Aveta Birth Unit in Cheltenham Hospital (“the Birth Unit”), a facility suitable only for low-risk births. The relevant guidelines required, on any unexplained vaginal bleeding, immediate transfer to the Gloucester Hospital (“the Hospital”) for full obstetric consultant care. The relevant guidelines warned: “beware of blood-stained liquor” (blood in the amniotic fluid).

At 3:40am on 14 May 2020, blood-stained liquor was noted in the medical records of a patient, the expected mother of a Baby Margot. At 1:25pm, Baby Margot was given an emergency transfer from the Birth Unit to the Hospital. The claimants had to attempt CPR to resuscitate Baby Margot in the high-speed ambulance whilst unrestrained. Baby Margot died in the Hospital a few days later. Both Claimants alleged to have suffered career-ending psychiatric injuries as a result.

The claimants’ case was that Baby Margot’s mother ought to have been transferred much earlier, given the 3.40am observation. It was alleged that but for this clinical negligence, the claimants would not have been involved in the ambulance transfer and would not have suffered their injuries.

In its pleadings, the Trust admitted breaches of duty and accepted that, had a consultant opinion been sought, on balance the birth would have been expedited, whilst not admitting that this would have avoided a traumatic birth or an emergency transfer.

Summary Judgment application

The claimants invited the court to grant summary judgment on an issue of factual causation: “whether Cs being required to assist in the highly traumatic ambulance transfer of a newborn baby …. was the result of D’s clinical negligence.”

The defendant filed no evidence in response, and in its skeleton, accepted that, given it advanced no positive case on the issue, the Court may well find it proven. However, it submitted that there was “some other compelling reason” why the issue should proceed to trial. The defendant’s arguments centred around the uncertainty of the claimants’ case on scope and breach of duty, unclear pleadings and the claimants relying on breach of clinical duties owed to third parties, namely Baby Margot and her mother.

The Master found in favour of the Defendant, refusing summary judgment, but recorded a finding of fact in the recital that there should have been an obstetric referral by no later than 5.50 am.

The claimants...

Image ©iStockphoto.com/izusek

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