News Category 3
Late-Acceptance of Part 36 Offers: Do Fixed Costs Apply? - Tom Collins, 1 Chancery Lane

03/03/17. It’s a little over a year now since the Court of Appeal gave judgment in Broadhurst v Tan, a decision which dramatically raised the stakes in fixed cost EL/PL and RTA cases where Part 36 offers are in play. Practitioners in this area will be very familiar with the case, which was discussed at the time by Thomas Crockett of 1 Chancery Lane. In the twelve months since the decision we have seen a much greater use of Part 36 offers by claimants and a greater willingness in response by defendants to take those offers seriously. By beating a Part 36 offer at trial, the array of benefits set out in rule 36.17(4) is engaged and a defendant may be left with a bill of damages and costs several times what would have been awarded had fixed costs applied, particularly if the offer was made early in proceedings or even pre-action.
By accepting a Part 36 offer within the relevant period (usually 21 days from the date of the offer), a defendant forgoes the opportunity to defend the claim but their liability for costs is limited to fixed costs.
But what are the cost consequences if an offer is accepted after the expiry of the relevant period? It’s not at all uncommon for defendants’ assessment of prospects to change late in the day – for instance if a witness is unable or unwilling to attend trial – by which time an offer could have long expired. The issue was not addressed in Broadhurst.
Rule 36.13(4) and (5) provide that where a claimant’s offer (which relates to the whole of the claim) is accepted after the expiry of the relevant period and the parties cannot agree a liability for costs, then unless the court considers it unjust to do so, the claimant will be awarded costs (i) up until the expiry of the relevant period and (ii) from that date until the date of acceptance. The rule is however silent as to the basis on which those costs are to be assessed. The commentary on this rule in the 2016 edition of the White Book, citing the High Court decision of Coulson J in Fitzpatrick Contractors Ltd v Tyco Fire and Integrated Solutions (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 274 (TCC), states that ‘there is no presumption that the court would order a late-accepting party to pay the other party’s costs on an indemnity basis. The usual basis will be the standard basis unless (say) conduct is in issue, in which event r.44.2 will apply’. The Court therefore has a...
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FREE BOOK CHAPTER: An Introduction to Personal Injury Litigation (From 'An Introduction to Personal Injury Law' by David Boyle)
02/05/17. Personal injury law is ubiquitous. Whilst only a tiny fraction of day to day legal practice in this country, it differs markedly from other areas of law because those engaged in this sort of law often work on an industrial scale, even though most individual clients only have one claim and might reasonably hope to receive a bespoke service. The advent of cold calling, advertising, and publicity from, amongst other sources, the insurance industry itself, has ensured that people are more aware than ever of the possibility of claiming compensation for injuries suffered as a result of somebody else’s wrongdoing.
The insurance industry, unsurprisingly, feels that such claims have gotten out of hand. They have lobbied long and hard to reduce the cost of meeting such claims and have sought to avoid certain types of claim altogether. The politics of personal injury litigation are, with one or two exceptions, outside the remit of this volume. It would, however, appear that the decision to rename Plaintiffs as Claimants, in the Woolf reforms of 1999, gave rise to an increased perception of ‘Claims Culture’ (whatever that might actually be).
Could it be that a simply linguistic shift put in place a new mind-set about the morality of an industry which seeks to compensate people who have suffered injury? The word plaintiff undoubtedly elicits more sympathy than its replacement and this may be an example of the law of unintended consequences.
In any event, the concept of personal injury law is a simple one: Somebody (the ‘claimant’) suffers an injury to the person because of the wrongful (or ‘tortious’) acts or omissions of somebody else (the ‘defendant’) and brings a claim against them seeking monetary compensation which, in general terms, is designed to put the claimant back in the position they would have been in but for the actions of the defendant.
Of course, compensation rarely achieves that goal. It is not like for like. In minor cases, it is more of a recognition of the inconvenience of suffering from short-lived symptoms1 , whilst in circumstances where there are permanent injuries (e.g. the loss of a limb) the money paid is not a magic wand, somehow undoing the injuries suffered. Given the choice between a cheque and going back to the pre-accident situation, most injured people would rather have the impossible. Lawyers are often accused of only being interested in money, but it is normally the only tool available.
Why is all this important? Society has, for many years, sought to protect its vulnerable citizens, providing a safety net for those who are injured, but that protection comes at a cost, and the resources of society are limited. A relatively low earner, whose financial contribution to society is predominantly to spend any salary received, is more easily compensated than the high earner, whose contribution extends not just to the income tax paid, but the jobs created, the salaries paid to others, the trade tariffs received by the government and so forth, but if somebody is injured and cannot work, there are significant ramifications, both for them and those around them, whatever their level of earnings and potential. If the person responsible can be identified and can be made to pay, why should the welfare state, which is designed as a safety net of last resort, have to pay instead?
Of course, the person responsible for causing the injury may not be in a position to make financial amends. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to pay his victim’s wages and other losses out of his own pocket. There is rarely any point in suing a ‘man of straw’, because the purpose of personal injury litigation is not to wreak vengeance upon the tortfeasor – it is to reach an end point where the claimant is compensated and, with any luck, the lawyers representing him will be paid. For those reasons, the existence of an insurance policy is often as significant as any other factor in personal injury litigation.
At this point, it is worth considering what it is that insurance actually does. Most people have come across home policies, motor policies or life policies. In each case, the insured party pays a sum of money (a ‘premium’) to the insurer for a policy of insurance which will pay out in the event that a specified type of event happens at some point in the future during the period for which the policy applies. That payment out can be a fixed amount, but is more normally an indemnity – a suitable sum to meet all liabilities which occur as a result of the event coming to fruition.
There has to be an element of chance to the risk coming to pass (one cannot insure against Friday happening next week) and it is, in effect, a bet, with the insurer taking the premium in the hope that it will not have to make payment. The very nature of the risk is uncertain, but there are normally risk factors which are well known to the insured and which the insurer has to factor in, in order to ensure that the deal being entered into a fair one. For those reasons, contracts of insurance are contracts of the utmost good faith – an insurer which takes the view that its insured has not been honest or has failed to declare a material fact will often withdraw indemnity under the policy. The effects of that withdrawal of indemnity differ depending on the type of policy in question and those matters are considered in the relevant chapters. What is or is not a material representation is beyond the scope of this book.
In some circumstances, the law requires an insurance policy to be taken out to cover certain risks. If one is driving a motor vehicle, there is a requirement under section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to hold a policy which will indemnify the driver against third party risks – his potential liability to another person arising from his negligent use of that motor car on the roads. The insured can go further, and take out a fully comprehensive policy which covers the losses which he might suffer as a result of his negligent driving, such as the repairs to his vehicle, but that is an option, rather than a legal requirement. Because the likely payout is greater (because two cars are potentially the subject of a claim for repairs rather than one), the premium is normally greater too. The other example of mandatory insurance is employers’ liability insurance under the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
Against that background, the law limits the circumstances in which such a claim can be made. It limits the types of harm which can be compensated. It limits who can bring a claim. It defines what does and does not constitute a ‘tort’ or wrong. It allows an injured person’s compensation to be reduced for their own fault. It limits what an injured person can claim for, and it identifies, in certain circumstances, how much one might recover for a particular head of claim.
The existence of an insurance policy makes a personal injury claim a commercial transaction. Whatever each side feels about the merits of the case, the outcome is most likely to be an argument about the need to pay a sum of money and the appropriate amount.
That means that the two sides should approach personal injury litigation with straight-forward goals and rules in mind. These are my formulations of the respective raisons d’être of the two sides:
The rule of three for claimants2 :
A claimant wants to get as much as possible, as quickly as possible, with as little risk as possible, but cannot have all three. That analysis should form the basis of all decision-making from the claimant’s perspective of the case, as long as one understands what is meant by risk. It is not merely the risk of losing and getting nothing, or failing to beat an offer. Whilst the word has negative connotations, risk is simply an element of uncertainty. Further evidence might clarify the future medical position for good or ill, but it reduces the risk, because the parties can be more certain of the outcome. Sometimes a decision has to be made at a point in time when the evidence is unclear. What is the effect of getting another scan? It might delay matters. It might show long-term deterioration which means that the case is worth more, or a lack of degenerative change which means that the case is worth less (albeit that that might be better news for the injured claimant). That is the ‘risk’ which has to be factored into the assessment, but for anybody advising a claimant, this starting point, with its visual reminder, remains an immensely useful tool.
The rule of three for defendants3 :
Defendants fight a case to trial for one or more of three reasons: To discourage the next claim, to resolve irreconcilable differences in the instant case, and/or a failure to appreciate that the case does not fall into one of the other two categories. From time to time somebody points out that cases sometimes fight because ‘the solicitors hate each other’ but, viewed closely, that tends to be a situation where both sides want to put down a marker for the next claim, their differences therefore become irreconcilable and they each then fail to realise that the case should be settled before trial, a combination of all three.
It is, of course, worth noting that whilst claimants tend to be individuals, invested in the outcome of the litigation because they have one chance to get the right result, defendants are normally represented by solicitors instructed by the insurance company. They have assessed the potential cost of the case, both in terms of damages which might be payable and the costs which both sides might incur. They are looking at the extent to which they can save on those potential liabilities. There is normally less emotion, not because the defendant is any less invested in the litigation process, but because, for the most part, the defendant has already reached the conclusion that personal injury litigation is a commercial transaction – a realisation which is harder to reach when one has suffered a potentially life-changing event.
David Boyle
Deans Court Chambers
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1 The cynic might add ‘whether or not they were actually suffered’.
2 Invariably demonstrated by holding up the thumb, index and middle fingers of the left hand at right angles to each other and using the index finger of the right hand to draw a clockwise circle in the air above the finger tips.
3 As above, with the hands swapped.
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The Eagle Has Landed! Coffee, Croissants and Counter Schedules - Simon Readhead QC, 1 Chancery Lane

19/03/17. How much do you spend on lunch? The answer for the average Briton is £53,844 during their working lives. Across a 40 year career another £40,128 goes on other workplace costs including coffees, teas, colleagues’ birthdays and work nights out.
Two recent studies will prove useful for counter schedulers seeking to justify discounting claims for loss of earnings, relying on Eagle v Chambers (No. 2) [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1033; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3081, to take account of and reflect the “costs of working” saved.
On behalf of Nationwide Current Accounts, 2,000 UK office workers were polled between 19 and 23 December 2016. The results (http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/media-centre-and-specialist-areas/media-centre/press-releases/archive/2017) revealed that the average office worker is likely to spend £1,003 per year on office life – and many are not very happy about it!
Pet dislikes include buying secret Santa presents (40%), chipping in for teas and coffees (41%) and paying for stationery (71%). But office workers are, on the whole, a sociable lot. Most (72%) are willing to contribute to a colleague’s leaving card and present (72%) or for an office birthday (72%). But we do our socialising at work. On average we spend more per year on coffees, teas, sweets and treats at work (£130.68) than we do on nights out with colleagues (£102.24).
These sums do not include travel - or lunch!
In one week Britons collectively spend £955,375,385 on lunch.
This information is contained in a January 2017 study by the discount website Voucher Codes (http://www.vouchercodespro.co.uk/) which polled 2,356 people in full time work from around the UK. The results revealed that on average we spend £4.75 per day on lunch. Most of us (71%) also buy lunch when we are at work rather than bringing in food from home. It also appears that the sandwich has had its day. When asked about their typical working lunch respondents said salad (27%), pasta / rice (23%), sandwich / baguette / wrap (19%), soup (14%) and fast food (11%).
Food for thought – for counter schedulers and everyone else!
Simon Readhead QC
1 Chancery Lane
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Football and Historic Sexual Abuse: The Approach to Quantum - Francesca O'Niell, 1 Chancery Lane

18/03/17. The news has been bleak and unrelenting: the scandal of historic child sexual abuse continues to fill the headlines. It seems as if no sector of society has been unaffected by this blight, but the news emanating from some (major) football clubs may be particularly difficult for the courts to deal with. By mid December, in response to allegations from 350 individuals, The Football Association, the Scottish Football Association, several football clubs and over 20 UK police forces had established various inquiries and investigations; on 21 December 2016, 155 potential suspects were said to be involved in alleged abuse of 429 individuals at 148 clubs.
So how might a court deal with a potential claim for lost earnings, following a successful criminal conviction of the abuser of a promising young football player who will argue that he would have gone on to play for the Premier League and gone on to earn millions, were it not for the abuse that he suffered?
The method by which the courts assess whether a future event would have occurred, but for the defendant’s negligence, is at the heart of any determination of causation and is often highly relevant to quantum. However, the authorities show a marked difference in the approach taken by the courts, with certain types of cases requiring that causation be proved on balance of probability, while in others an assessment of lost opportunity has been considered more appropriate. Additionally, this lost opportunity approach (lost chance) is proving increasingly important in the quantification of damages for personal injury and, in particular, in respect of lost earnings. This is well illustrated in the recent clinical negligence case of XYZ v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2011], in which the claimant was awarded approximately £5.8m for loss of earnings and business opportunity.
Will the courts follow Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995], where the Court of Appeal found that it was not necessary for the claimant to show, on balance, that there would have certainly been a successful outcome, but simply that there was a real possibility of that outcome coming to pass?
It is much more likely that merely showing that there was a real possibility of an abuse victim becoming a successful professional footballer will not be enough to satisfy the courts that any substantial award of damages should be made. A more nuanced approach will be used, following a trio of “loss of a chance” cases with a somewhat similar premise: in Doyle v Wallace [1998] 30 LS Gaz R 25, [1998] PIQR Q146, CA, a court awarded damages to a trainee teacher who argued that she would have gone on to be a full time teacher but for the injury that she suffered in an accident. The court made a calculation based on there being a 50% chance of that career eventuating. In Langford v Hebran [2001] PIQR Q160, the claimant was a trainee bricklayer who had also just begun a promising career as a professional kickboxer. He was injured in a whiplash-inducing accident, and provided the court with a selection of scenarios in which he went on to have a successful kickboxing career to varying degrees. The Court of Appeal accepted this method of assessing quantum - the claimant was entitled to a percentage of the increased earnings he could have expected in each of the predicted scenarios, with a discount to take account of the possibility that his success may have been temporary, or that he may not have realised any of the hypothetical scenarios suggested.
How could this applied to the wannabe footballer? In Appleton –v- Medhat Mohammed El Safty [2007] EWHC 631 (QB), the court followed Langford and awarded damages on the basis that the claimant had a 75% chance of playing championship football and a 25% chance of playing in the Premier League.
It is my view that courts deliberating on how to award damages in a successful claim against a football club will use a similar formula to those illustrated above. But how many of these claims will actually be successful? It will be interesting to see how the courts deal with causation – the subject of my next blawg on the subject!
Francesca O'Niell
1 Chancery Lane
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Summary of Recent Cases, March 2017

15/03/17. Here is a summary of the recent notable court cases over the past month. You can also receive these for free by registering for our PI Brief Update newsletter. Just select "Free Newsletter" from the menu at the top of this page and fill in your email address.
Summary of Recent Cases - Substantive Law
Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v FG (on behalf of John (a minor) [2017] EWCA Civ 61
The Secretary of State for Work & Pensions (SSWP) appealed against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (UT) that the respondent was entitled to compensation under the vaccine damages payments scheme. It was accepted that the respondent had been left with severe narcolepsy and cataplexy as a result of receiving a pandemic influenza vaccine at the age of 7. However, his mother's initial claim under the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 was refused on the basis that...
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